



The United Nations Security Council and Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program





History of Iran's Nuclear Program

- Iran's nuclear program launched in the 1950's and continued into the 1970's with support of U.S. and Western Europe
- 1979 revolution was a turning point in foreign-cooperation on nuclear technology
- Iran did inform the IAEA of its plans to restart its nuclear program using indigenously-made nuclear fuel (Technical Assistance Program)
- However, IAEA forced to terminate the program under U.S. pressure




Iran's Motives for Pursuing Nuclear Power

- Perception of security threats from Pakistan, Israel, Iraq, and the United States
- Domestic economic and political dynamics
- National Pride



The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Iran's Right to Peaceful Nuclear Energy?

- Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1969
- Article IV reaffirms that all countries have the “inalienable right...to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”
- Under the NPT, Iran can expect international cooperation in exercising such rights to benefit from peaceful nuclear energy

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- Under Article II, rights under the NPT are conditioned on the obligation “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons; and not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons”
 - Because Iran has been found non-compliant with its obligations and has not enabled the IAEA to verify its compliance with the core Article II obligation that conditions all rights to nuclear energy – Iran, has lost (temporarily), full enjoyment of its nuclear rights
 - Iran’s case is now an enforcement problem, not a rights problem

REALLY...
IT'S FOR
PEACEFUL,
DOMESTIC
USES...





- The IAEA has confirmed several breaches of Iran's safeguard agreement. These breaches span two decades and include failure to report on:
 - Import and processing of nuclear material
 - Failing to declare enrichment facilities
 - Failing to provide design information on several facilities handling nuclear materials



Prior to August 2002, the sites circled above were kept hidden by Iran. These locations were revealed as a result of subsequent investigations by the IAEA.



- The IAEA can take some measures once non-compliance has been established. First, it is required to make a report to all member states, the Security Council, and the General Assembly.

- Second, it may:
 - Curtail or suspend assistance to the state
 - Call for the return of materials and equipment
 - Suspend the state from the rights / privileges of IAEA membership

“Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its Nonproliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement...constitute non compliance....”

“The history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities..., the nature of these activities, ...issues brought to light in the course of the Agency’s verification..., and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council....”

IAEA Board of Governors, September 24, 2005



Backdrop to the Iran Nuclear Conflict

- In 2002, Iran admitted to clandestine development of two uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz, a heavy water production plant and nuclear reactor at Arak, and undeclared receipt of natural uranium in 1991.
- In June 2003, IAEA Director General declared that Iran had “failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement.”
- Despite subsequent partial cooperation by Iran, IAEA continued to discover undisclosed nuclear materials.



Backdrop to the Iran Nuclear Conflict

- Negotiations: UK, France and Germany (EU-3) have been negotiating with Iran with an aim toward achieving Iran's compliance with NPT and Safeguards Agreement obligations.
- Iran has suspended its enrichment-related activities several times, but always has restarted following breakdown in negotiations.



Backdrop to the Iran Nuclear Conflict

- In 2004, IAEA Director General reported, and IAEA Board of Governors accepted, that all declared nuclear materials and activities were accounted for; outstanding questions concern undeclared nuclear materials and activities.
- In 2005, the U.S. signals a major change in policy and indicates that the U.S. will back the negotiation track led by the EU-3 and offer economic incentives to Iran to give up alleged nuclear ambitions.
- 2006 ~ U.N. Security Council passes series of resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran.



U.N. Security Council Resolutions

- Resolution 1737, Dec. 2006, imposes sanctions that target:
 - ✓ Proliferation-related goods and technology (enrichment, reprocessing or heavy-water related), and those that could contribute to the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems
 - ✓ Related technical assistance, training, financial assistance and other services
 - ✓ Proliferation-related training and education programs for Iranian nationals
 - ✓ Financial assets of selected individuals and organizations closely related to the Iranian nuclear program



U.N. Security Council Resolutions

- Resolution 1747, March 2007, imposes further sanctions:
 - ✓ Banning arms exports from Iran
 - ✓ Requiring U.N. member states to exercise restraint in sales to Iran of certain categories of heavy conventional arms
 - ✓ Designating additional individuals and entities, including *Bank Sepah* and those affiliated with IRGC, as subject to the asset freeze requirement
 - ✓ Urging U.N. member states and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for financial assistance to the government of Iran (except humanitarian / developmental purposes).
 - ✓ Reaffirming Iran's obligation to suspend nuclear activities or face additional sanctions.



U.N. Security Council Resolutions

- Resolution 1803, March 2008, imposes further sanctions:
 - ✓ Imposing travel bans on five Iranian officials
 - ✓ Freezing foreign assets of 13 Iranian companies and 13 Iranian officials
 - ✓ Banning sale of dual-use items to Iran (military/civilian)
 - ✓ Urging governments to withdraw financial backing from firms trading with Iran
 - ✓ Inspecting cargo going in and out of the country
 - ✓ Requesting IAEA to report on whether Iran has complied with demand to suspend uranium enrichment
 - ✓ If not, threatens further sanctions



UN Sanctions: Weighing the Risks and Benefits

- Potential Risks:
 - Antagonize rather than intimidate, and Iran escalates
 - Domestic backfire
 - Convey international community weakness, not strength (if next set of sanctions are limited / not compelling)
 - United States escalates



UN Sanctions: Weighing the Risks and Benefits

- Potential Benefits:
 - Diplomatic success
 - Momentum towards reconciliation
 - Weaken the more extreme Islamic revolutionaries
 - Positive effect on other conflicts
 - Positive effect on the non-proliferation regime

Iran's ballistic missiles Washington has intelligence suggesting Iran is working on the technology to deliver a nuclear warhead on a missile. US officials have estimated Iranian development of a nuclear weapon is three to five years away.

Ranges



Types

| | | | | | |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| Human to scale | | | | | |
| Range (miles) | 175 | 310 | 810 | 1,240 | 2,175 |
| Height (feet) | 36.7 | 40.4 | 52.5 | 82.0 | 105.0 |
| Status | Operational | Operational | Operational | Developing | Developing |

Note: Ranges shown are estimates for a 2,200 pound payload

Source: Federation of American Scientists

Reuters



A Diplomatic Proposal: The “Zero Enrichment” Option

- Iran, the EU and Russia, with U.S. support, agree on a proposal under which:
 - ✓ Iran would indefinitely suspend enrichment activity
 - ✓ Verified by a highly intrusive inspections regime (IAEA)

In exchange for:

- ✓ An internationally guaranteed fuel supply
- ✓ Access to advanced nuclear technology
- ✓ U.S. backed security assurances
- ✓ A gradual lifting of sanctions
- ✓ Resumption of normal diplomatic relations with U.S.



A Diplomatic Proposal: The “Zero Enrichment” Option

As a “power-broker” and a gesture of goodwill, U.S. agrees:

- ✓ Not to threaten or use force against Iran
- ✓ Refrain from interfering with Iran’s importation of nuclear technologies for civilian purposes, as permitted under the NPT
- ✓ Support, where needed, EU economic incentives, in particular by backing Iran’s WTO accession
- ✓ Recognizing Iran’s regional role, engage in discussions with Tehran on Iraq’s reconstruction and political future
- ✓ Unfreeze Iran’s assets in the U.S.



Issues for Discussion

- Probability of Iran's withdrawal from the NPT?
- Negotiations – additional economic incentives? Skillful use of “carrot and stick” techniques?
- EU vs. US approaches to conflict
- Other key players: Russia and China
- Use of force without UN Security Council authorization